Abstract-In this paper we present a distributed Dynamic Spectrum Access framework which can scale up to networks of large size. According to it, the network is divided into clusters, and spectrum access is performed by leveraging on a virtual network coded cognitive control channel that works in conjunction with a channel allocation scheme based on graph coloring. We evaluate the performance of this approach in terms of control information dissemination reliability, channel allocation efficiency, inter-cluster interference and control information overhead. Finally, we compare the proposed solution to state-ofthe-art schemes with respect to some known security attacks that can be performed against Dynamic Spectrum Access networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) strategies have enjoyed a strong interest by the research community in recent years. By leveraging on the possibility of allowing unlicensed devices (secondary users) to access unused portions of the licensed spectrum, these strategies are expected to improve the utilization efficiency of the spectrum itself, thus supporting more communication services with enhanced quality, potentially opening new business models and opportunities.
However, in spite of the huge research effort which has been devoted to this field, DSA is not yet a reality. The reason for this is that in the identification of suitable implementation strategies for DSA networks there are several challenges to be addressed, such as control information exchange, channel allocation and multi-channel medium access, as well as scalability and security.
We note that many solutions have been proposed in the recent literature for each of the above mentioned problems, however none of the DSA architectures proposed so far addresses all of them in an efficient way. Well known architectures such as IEEE 802.22 [1] and CORVUS [2] , based on centralized and decentralized architectures respectively, rely on global and/or local common control channels to share spectrum sensing information and to exchange the signaling information that is a pre-requisite for initiating communications. This solution limits scalability in terms of devices and traffic density, and is not robust to, e.g., jamming attacks. As to medium access and resource allocation, IEEE 802.22 presents a centralized solution where the secondary base stations take care of resource management issues based on inputs collected during a distributed sensing phase carried out by secondary users. However, coordination among multiple secondary base stations, especially in terms of mutual and aggregated interference that they may generate to primary receivers, is still an open issue [3] . On the other hand, solutions like CORVUS do not explicitly address the problem of multichannel and multiuser access in the absence of a centralized controller.
In our prior work [4] - [6] we proposed the Network Coded Cognitive Control Channel (NC 4 ) for the realization of multichannel DSA networks. NC 4 addresses in a joint fashion the problems of the common control channel, the multi-channel medium access and the efficient channel allocation, and as such stands as a very promising solution for DSA. Our prior work, however, considered only networks having finite size (few hundreds of nodes); this is a significant limitation, since the ultimate DSA architecture is expected to be utilized in very large networks, in order to provide support for coordinated spectrum access by secondary users, potentially even belonging to different operator networks. Furthermore, NC 4 security has never been discussed so far.
In this paper, we extend our prior work proposing a new solution, denominated Clustered NC 4 (CNC 4 ), which allows NC 4 to scale up to networks of virtually infinite size. The original contributions of this paper are: 1) the adaptation of NC 4 to work in cluster-based networks where nodes are interested in receiving information from all the nodes of the same cluster while avoiding to interfere with primary users and with communications in adjacent clusters; 2) the definition of a channel allocation strategy which aims at the efficient sharing of the available spectrum resources to the secondary users within a cluster; 3) the evaluation of the performance with respect to the issues of control information dissemination, channel allocation efficiency, spectrum collisions and control information overhead; 4) an in-depth discussion of the security features of the resulting scheme, comparing it with other known DSA solutions.
II. THE PROPOSED SCHEME The key concept on which CNC 4 is based is that instead of aiming at coordinating all secondary users in the network for spectrum access purposes, as we proposed in [6] , we divide the network into clusters of suitable size, and we then manage spectrum resources independently for each cluster. In other words, a secondary user will have to coordinate for spectrum access only with those nodes that belong to the same cluster. Clearly, this approach enables scalability, but also introduces additional performance issues, such as the inter-cluster interference arising due to the fact that nodes in adjacent clusters may access the same spectrum resource simultaneously. In this section, we describe in detail how CNC 4 works; its performance will be discussed later in Section III.
We assume that the electromagnetic spectrum is already partitioned into a set of channels which are assigned to 2010 5th International Symposium on Wireless Pervasive Computing (ISWPC) 978-1-4244-6857-7/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE2 licensed primary users and may be opportunistically accessed by secondary unlicensed users. We consider secondary users equipped with half-duplex communication devices that can be tuned to only one channel at a time. We adopt a protocol interference model both for the communications among secondary users and for the interactions between primary and secondary users. For secondary users, we consider an interference range equal to the communication range, which is for simplicity set equal to the unit length.
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N} denote a generic secondary user. We denote with N k i the set of secondary users which are khop neighbors of i, i.e., at most k hops away from user i. We assume that a neighbor discovery technique suitable for DSA networks is adopted; examples of neighbor discovery strategies appropriate for this purpose can be found in the literature [7] - [10] . 1 We also assume that a clustering algorithm is adopted, which aims at partitioning the network into clusters of a given radius k (expressed in number of hops), and at the same time accounts for the local spectrum availability when creating clusters. That is, the clustering algorithm maximizes the number of free channels which are common to all the users in the same cluster. 2 Several clustering algorithms recently proposed in the literature can be used for this purpose [8] , [11] , [13] ; the particular choice of the algorithm, and of its run-time parameters, will result in different values of the cluster size k and of the number of available channels C which are shared by all users within a cluster.
Within each cluster, NC 4 is used to disseminate control information among secondary users without the need for a dedicated control channel. The control information disseminated by each user to all the other users in a cluster consists of all the information that is needed to achieve spectrum access coordination, such as the list of intended receivers for each secondary user and possibly the corresponding quality of service requirements. For a detailed description of how NC 4 works, the reader is referred to [4] .
Once the control information has been disseminated among the users inside a cluster, transmission opportunities (i.e., slots in available channels) need to be allocated to secondary users for data transmission. With respect to this issue, in [4] we investigated a simple proof-of-concept channel allocation algorithm which aimed at uniform resource sharing among all users in a single hop network. In [6] we argued that for multihop scenarios more complex resource algorithms need to be considered, in order to provide means for frequency reuse while at the same time addressing the issue of interference among nodes reusing the same frequency. In the following we describe a practical method for their implementation.
We note that the problem of channel allocation with frequency reuse has been extensively analyzed in the past, first in the context of cellular networks and more recently for multi-channel mesh and ad hoc networks. In particular, the vast majority of channel allocation techniques are based on graph coloring techniques; a survey of these techniques can be found in [14] . For secondary user networks in which the maximum number of channels is not a design parameter but is rather imposed by the scenario constraints (i.e., primary user location and activity), we found it more appropriate to consider the variation of the Graph Coloring problem which is known as the Call Control problem [15] - [17] . According to this formulation, we model the resource allocation problem as an undirected graph G(V, E) where V and E are the sets of vertices and edges, respectively. A vertex v ∈ V represents a pair of users (the transmitter t v and the receiver r v ) which are requesting a channel to be allocated for data transmission. We have an edge (v, w) ∈ E between two vertices v, w ∈ V if t v and r w (or t w and r v , since the graph is undirected) are neighbors; in words, there is an edge between two transmitter-receiver pairs whenever they cannot be simultaneously allocated the same channel. We have a number of channels C available for the allocation; the problem we need to solve consists in allocating channels to pairs of secondary users in such a way that if there exists an edge among them, then they will be assigned to different channels. Note that, unlike the traditional graph coloring problem, it can happen that it is not feasible to assign a channel to every node. A good solution (i.e., a good channel assignment) would maximize the number of colored nodes, i.e., the number of transmitter-receiver pairs which are assigned a transmission opportunity.
Several solutions have been proposed in the literature to solve this type of problem [15] - [17] . In our case, we argue that a greedy algorithm such as the one proposed in [15] , [18] is the best choice. The main reason is that, as discussed in [4] , the allocation algorithm must be executed by each node for every allocation period, where the duration of an allocation period ranges from fractions of a second to a few seconds. Therefore, the allocation algorithm must be very fast. To satisfy this requirement, we adopt a modified version of the algorithm in [15] , where the modifications aim at introducing randomness in the selection of the nodes which are allocated first. The reason for this is that, as discussed in [4] , NC 4 requires the pseudo-random allocation of channels to users with the aim of enhancing the dissemination of the control information. The pseudo-code of the resulting algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1.
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed CNC 4 scheme. We assume that secondary users are positioned according to a spatial Poisson process of rate λ users per unit area, and we will evaluate the performance focusing on a circular cluster of radius k hops where C channels are available to all the secondary users within the cluster. The results in Sections III-A and III-B are obtained by means of simulations: we repeated several experiments for different values of k, λ and C, and we averaged the performance over a suitable number of independent simulations for every particular setting in order to achieve good statistical confidence.
A. Intra-cluster control information dissemination
We first focus on the dissemination performance of control packets within a cluster. This performance can be summarized Algorithm 1 Modified version of the Greedy Frequency Allocation of [15] 1: for n = 1 . . . N do 2: 
r ← RandomElement(R) // consider a new candidate receiver 10:
r } // candidate transmitters in range of this receiver
11:
if W = ∅ then
12:
t ← RandomElement(W) // randomly select a candidate transmitter 13:
t } // allowed channels for the transmitter 14:
r } // allowed channels for the receiver 15 :
if C = ∅ then
17:
Ct ← {RandomElement(C)} // allocate channel to transmitter
18:
Cr ← Ct // the receiver will tune to the same channel 19 : U ← U ∪ {r} // add to set of candidate transmitters by two metrics: the probability P retr that a user correctly retrieves the control information by all the other users in the same cluster, and the number S of time slots that are required to reach a given value of P retr . In order to be effective, NC 4 needs to operate with a high P retr , i.e., S must be sufficiently large. Unfortunately, a higher value of S has a negative impact on the control information overhead and on the response time of the system [4] . In this paper, we are interested in evaluating how the dissemination performance depends on the characteristics of the cluster, in order to assess the performance of CNC 4 and to tune its parameters. In order to do this, we simulated the dissemination of control information using NC 4 within a single cluster. We assume that there are no packet losses due to intra-cluster interference (this issue will be addressed later in Section III-C).
In Figure 1 we plot the minimum number S of slots required by CNC 4 to achieve P retr = 0.97. First of all, we note that S increases with the cluster radius; this is because the cluster includes nodes that are farther away from each other, requiring more slots to disseminate packets to nodes that are located at the opposite sides of the cluster. For fixed C and k, we note that S diminishes slightly for increasing λ, as the scheme is able to disseminate the packets faster, due to the increased average number of nodes that meet in each channel.
An interesting behavior emerges when the number of available channels C decreases. Limiting the number of channels forces the nodes to access the same channel, leading to a reduction in the value of S required to achieve the target P retr . The results suggest that, in terms of promptness of the scheme to disseminate control information, it is better to have the lowest possible number of available channels and small cluster sizes. However, we note that in general a lower number of available channels implies a lower amount of spectrum resources available for data communications, which is not desirable. Furthermore, small cluster sizes lead to increased inter-cluster interference and increased number of hops for inter-cluster communication; this aspect will be discussed in detail in Section III-D. 
B. Channel allocation
The obtained average spectrum efficiency E [ζ] in number of allocated transmissions per unit area per channel per slot as a function of the node density λ per unit area is shown in Figure 2 . We observe that the efficiency reaches its maximum for λ/C → ∞, which confirms the observation made in [19] that if the node density per channel is large enough then the maximum efficiency can be achieved even if every node is equipped with a single wireless interface. For a fixed value of λ/C, we note that a higher value of C achieves a higher efficiency; this effect is due to the fact that the allocation algorithm has more degrees of freedoms. Finally, we note that there is a very weak dependency of the efficiency on the cluster radius k.
C. Impact of spectrum collisions
In this section we derive an analytical model for the spectrum utilization efficiency taking into account the interference coming both from misinformed users 3 inside the considered cluster and from users in adjacent clusters. Let A denote the area of the cluster. Consider a single node; let B denote the area within its communication range, and furthermore let I = A ∩ B and O = A ∩ B, i.e., I and O denote the part of the communication area inside and outside the cluster, respectively. For a generic area X, let N (X) denote the number of users in area X. From the theory of Poisson processes [20] , we recall that
We consider values of λ such that the probability that one user is isolated is negligible. Furthermore, we use the results of the simulations described in Sections III-A and III-B to obtain a characterization of 1) the dissemination performance in terms of P retr , and 2) the probability P rx and P tx that Algorithm 1 allocates respectively a reception and transmission opportunity to a certain user.
A generic node will be the receiver of a correct data exchange if all the following events are verified simultaneously:
• event R: the node is chosen as a receiver. This happens with probability P R = P rx .
• event D: both the transmitter and the receiver correctly retrieved the control information. This happens with probability P D = P 2 retr ; • event M : no misinformed user in I transmits in the same channel as the considered user. This happens with probability 
• event F : no users in O transmits in the same channel as the considered user. Note that it does not matter whether the users in O retrieved the control information or not, since they are in another cluster and do not participate in the same allocation as the considered user. Event F is verified with the following probability:
To summarize, the probability P rxcde that a chosen node is the receiver of a correct data exchange is given by
We note that P rxcde depends on the position of the chosen node, as well as the parameters of the scenario being considered (λ, A, B, P rx ). We define the random variable X n which is equal to 1 if user n is the receiver of a correct data exchange in the considered timeslot, and to 0 otherwise. We define the spectrum utilization efficiency per unit area as
Since η is a random sum [20] , and assuming that E [X n ] = P rxcde ∀n, 5 we get
D. Goodput From (7) it follows that the expected number of successful transmissions within the cluster in a certain time slot is given by λ|A|P rxcde . Let T all , T slot and T ctrl be the duration of respectively the allocation period, the time slot and the control packet, as defined in [4] . If the entire duration of a time slot were assigned to data transmission, the expected total time E [τ ] allocated for successful data transmissions (obtained summing the time spent at different channels and locations in the cluster) would be given by (8) where T slot = T all /S. However, the transmissions of control packets by all users also need to be accommodated. Since each user needs to transmit exactly one control packet per slot, the expected total overhead time E [O] spent in that time slot for the transmission of all control packets in the cluster is given by
We can therefore express the expected overhead efficiency E [ρ] of our CNC 4 scheme as
We note that, similarly to what was observed in [4] , the effect of the overhead vanishes for T all → ∞, and that ST ctrl > P rxcde T all does not yield a feasible system, since the time to be spent for the transmission of control packets would leave no room for data transmissions.
Finally, the expected system goodput E [G] per channel per unit area is calculated as
The resulting goodput performance is reported in Figure 3 . We note that, for fixed values of λ and C, there exists an optimal value of k which provides maximum goodput. To understand this, we recall that in Section III-C we showed that the bigger the cluster size the better; on the other hand, in Section III-A we have seen that a bigger cluster has dissemination problems, i.e., will require a longer dissemination phase to reach a reasonable P retr , which will in turn yield a higher control information overhead. This explains the presence of a maximum in the dependency of the goodput performance on the cluster size. k λ/C=7, P retr =0.97, T all /T ctrl =1000 λ/C=7, P retr =0.97, T all /T ctrl =1500 λ/C=7, P retr =0.97, T all /T ctrl =2000 λ/C=7, P retr =0.97, T all /T ctrl =2500 λ/C=7, P retr =0.97, T all /T ctrl =3000 λ/C=7, P retr =0.97, T all /T ctrl =3500 λ/C=7, P retr =0.97, T all /T ctrl =4000 Fig. 3 . Goodput performance of CNC 4 .
IV. SECURITY In this section we discuss the security implications of CNC 4 and we compare its vulnerabilities versus two typical cognitive radio network architectures: i) centralized and infrastructure based (e.g., IEEE 802.22 [1] ); ii) ad hoc and infrastructure-less (e.g., CORVUS [2] ). The objective is to understand the advantages and disadvantages offered by CNC 4 from a security perspective. We consider a system with an authority responsible for assigning credentials and identities to all system entities. In particular, we assume that integrity and authentication of the control messages sent by every node are guaranteed.
With respect to the adversary model, we assume that adversaries have the same communications capabilities of the benign secondary users, so that they participate in the proposed scheme as any other user. The aforementioned scheme expects that every secondary user in the network obeys the following rules:
• not to intentionally create unacceptable interference to licensed primary users; • not to prevent other secondary users from using available bands, for either selfish or malicious objectives; • to correctly encode and forward the received packet, thus contributing to the distribution of signaling and state information; • to participate in the timely dissemination of correct state information, thus contributing to a sound knowledge base for decisions in the cognitive radio network. In the following we will discuss the following four attacks: 1) Jamming of the Control Channel (CC); 2) Primary user emulation attack; 3) Byzantine modification; 4) Byzantine fabrication.
1) Jamming of the CC: traditional DSA schemes rely on the presence of a common control channel, which can be either statically allocated or following a predefined channel hopping pattern. In both cases it is straightforward for a malicious user to prevent control information exchange among secondary users by simply jamming the allocated control channel. The impossibility of exchanging control information will prevent secondary users from coordinating for data communication in all channels, thus resulting in a Denial of Service attack to the secondary user network. On the other hand, the use of CNC 4 avoids the CC jamming problem, since the control information is disseminated over all available channels, and consequently there is no single point of failure (i.e., the whole system band would need to be jammed for the attack to be successful).
2) Primary User Emulation Attack: according to the primary user emulation attack, a secondary user capable of transmitting a signal with the same spectral characteristics of a legitimate primary signal may prevent other secondary users from occupying a certain band. The objective may be both selfish, (i.e., the secondary user attacker is interested in occupying the bandwidth itself, so that it performs the attack till the neighbor secondary users have switched to a different channel), or malicious (i.e., the secondary user is interested only in damaging other secondary users' communications). Centralized cognitive radio schemes, such as IEEE 802.22, consider a cognitive radio network operating in only one channel at a time, and switching to a different one after the collaborative detection of a primary user. This type of infrastructure based architecture is particularly vulnerable to the primary user emulation attack, since a malicious user may jump to the frequency channels where the cognitive radio network is switching after spectrum handoff, and iteratively perform the attack, thus leading to denial of service in the whole network. Infrastructureless architectures, such as CORVUS, are vulnerable to the attack with selfish objectives, but are more robust to the same attack with malicious objectives than an infrastructure based scheme. In fact, in this case the whole network of secondary users does not switch to the same frequency channel, after the detection of a primary user, but different groups of secondary users may decide to switch to different channels according to the result of their spectrum decision making process. As a result, a malicious user may decide to iteratively perform the emulation attack following the spectrum handoffs of a group of secondary users, thus damaging the communications of only a group of users in the network. This attack has been extensively studied in the literature [21] , [22] and schemes based on the primary user emitter locations and on the signature of the primary signal have been proposed.
The CNC 4 scheme is robust to this attack. In particular, with respect to the selfish objective, an adversary secondary user emulates the primary signal in the frequency channel it is interested in occupying, so as to force other secondary users to vacate that channel. However, as soon as the adversary user starts using the channel for secondary transmissions, interrupting the mimicking of the primary signal, other secondary users (randomly hopping over the available channels) will eventually detect this channel as free from primary activity, thus considering it for communications. As a result, this attack is not rewarding for a selfish user. On the other side, when the attack is performed with a malicious intent, the CNC 4 scheme is even more robust than other approaches, as secondary users are spread over all the available channels and spectrally move in order to sense the multiple channels in different instants and distribute sensing information about them using the network coded cognitive control channel. As a result, an effective attack should involve multiple colluded malicious users emulating primary signals in all the available channels, which would be significantly more difficult.
3) Byzantine modification: the CNC 4 scheme is vulnerable to all the attacks which can be inflicted to network coding.
A possible attack is the Byzantine modification, according to which a malicious node may intentionally modify the messages in transit. In particular, changes in the coefficients and/or the encoded payload may render the native packets undecodable. The proposed protocol is particularly vulnerable to this attack, since network coding relies on mixing the content of multiple data packets, so that a single corrupted packet may jeopardize the entire information flow, at any time. Possible defense towards this attack is the application of end to end error correction or misbehavior detection schemes, as discussed in [23] . On the other hand, cognitive radio networks based on both centralized and ad hoc architectures are normally immune to this attack, unless they rely on cooperative and relaying mechanisms. In fact, such a cooperative scheme can suffer from the Byzantine attack since secondary users have a chance to act as relays of the primary communications, and instead of forwarding correct information, they might send arbitrary information to the primary destination, thus significantly damaging the physical layer primary system performance [24] .
4) Byzantine Fabrication: as all cognitive radio networks rely on collaborative spectrum sensing and primary detection procedures, the CNC 4 scheme is vulnerable to the so called Byzantine fabrication attack, which consists in reporting false feedback about a certain event. For example, due to false information propagated by one or by a group of colluded malicious users, secondary users may consider as occupied a free frequency band, or viceversa. A frequently proposed solution for this kind of node misbehavior in ad hoc networks is to use reputation systems, where each node is associated with a certain value of trust or reputation derived from a fairly long history of past behaviors. In general, in infrastructureless ad hoc cognitive radio networks, it is infeasible to monitor the neighbors' behavior for a sufficiently long time, since nodes are characterized by high spectral mobility and switch from one frequency channel to another. The security implications of this are very similar to those of a vehicular ad hoc network, characterized by spatial mobility instead of spectral mobility. Consequently, interactions among users are commonly quite transient and do not rely on any prior association, so that traditional trust schemes cannot be directly applied. This is not the case for both centralized cognitive radio networks, where the secondary users can be expected to trust the users belonging to the same network, and for the CNC 4 scheme that we propose, where the secondary users that are geographically close meet each other very frequently in the network coded cognitive control channel. As a result, in this context, a malicious secondary user propagating false information may be easily detected if this information is considered as incongruous by the other users. Based on that, reputation schemes can be built to reduce as much as possible the impact of misbehaving users.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented the CNC 4 scheme, which aims at providing Dynamic Spectrum Access capabilities to wireless networks of virtually infinite size. Our performance evaluation showed that CNC 4 can achieve a satisfactory performance even when we consider issues such as control information dissemination reliability, channel allocation efficiency, and both intra-and inter-cluster interference. Furthermore, when compared with state-of-the-art DSA schemes, CNC 4 offers many advantages with respect to security issues. Future research directions include the development of more efficient dissemination and channel allocation techniques, as well as the investigation of clustering and neighbor discovery strategies specifically designed for CNC 4 .
